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News and the empowerment
of citizens
Justin Lewis
Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies
abstract This article argues that we need to take the democratic promise
of news seriously and find ways to advance that promise. It begins by
considering both the importance of news to democratic citizenship, and its
failure to deliver in ways that do not compound social inequalities. It argues
against more optimistic accounts of the state of democratic citizenship, but
finds that the notion of public service journalism often lapses into a class-
specific discourse for the information-rich. Meanwhile, current news values
are contradictory and incoherent, allowing us space to build upon the
democratic ideals in journalistic philosophy. The article then argues that
citizenship should be brought from the margins of news to its centre. This
means implicating citizenship into the news’s mode of address, of going
beyond the narrow narratives of current news values and addressing broad
citizenship concerns.
keywords citizenship, democracy, journalism, news values
Introduction
This article argues that we might re-examine the nature of ‘news’ in
order to enhance the quality of citizenship. This involves moving beyond
the question of how well news ‘serves the needs of democracy’ (Bennett,
2005: 9), to consider what it would look like if it did. Of course, the
idealism of such an endeavour is tempered by the art of the possible, and
the aim here is to begin a discussion of practical and strategic forms of
intervention.
The concern here is with dominant news culture rather than with
alternative forms of journalism or the potential of the ‘citizen journalist’.
This is not to belittle the alternatives: on the contrary, there is no doubt
that the growth of the world wide web and cheap digital technology has
raised serious questions about the viability of journalistic practice and
what constitutes its professionalism. But while some might wish the whole
edifice of mainstream news culture to come crashing down, it is also an
apposite time to ask hard questions about the social utility of news. To put
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it bluntly, journalism needs to justify itself, which opens up opportunities
for asking how journalism might serve us better.
Citizenship and news
This article will begin by briefly outlining three assumptions that inform
the discussion that follows. The first and most profound of these is to assert
the importance of informed citizenship. In short, the health of a democ-
racy depends upon the quality of information that people receive about
politics and public affairs, leading to meaningful political discourse and
deliberation (Cohen, 1997; Iyengar, 1991; McNair, 1994, 2005; Neuman
et al., 1992).
If this is a familiar assertion in political communications research, it is
less familiar in the cultural studies literature, where there is suspicion of
too narrow a definition of citizenship and the political realm. Cultural
studies stresses the political significance of the cultural sphere, including
what David Morley (1986) calls ‘the politics of the living room’. There-
fore, we should take care to avoid resurrecting what Peter Dahlgren (1992:
12) calls a ‘pre-Freudian conception of rational man’, which characterizes
both journalism research and establishment models of the public sphere
(Murdock, 1999).
Further, we should guard against the approach taken in much citizen-
ship instruction, with its emphasis on process and abstraction rather than
‘on a politics of involvement and experience’ (Gifford, 2004: 157). But if
cultural studies stretches our notion of citizenship and the political, it does
not negate the importance of informing political discourse. So while we
should be inclusive about what constitutes ‘meaningful political discourse’,
we need to hold on to the notion that active citizenship depends upon infor-
mation, that not all information is equally useful and that citizenship as a
mode of being is distinct, and therefore informed in distinctive ways.
So, for example, if we want to promote the idea of democratic media,
this means much more than giving people access to the technology, for
example, to watch television programmes on demand. Informed cultural
citizenship involves understanding the range of cultural possibilities, and
ultimately, having a voice in defining the scope of those cultural possibili-
ties. For this reason, it could be argued, media literacy is not just about the
way that we consume media but the policy framework within which it is
produced (Lewis and Jhally, 1998).
The idealism behind this proposition is not held universally. Famously,
Walter Lippmann (1922) and Joseph Schumpeter (1976) have advanced
more élitist versions of democracy in which citizens play only peripheral
roles. More recently, scholars have suggested either that citizens can
function democratically without much information (Popkin, 1991), or that
this ideal is simply unrealistic (Schudson, 1998). These ‘top-down’ versions
of democracy are anathema to a cultural studies approach, and the notion304
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that a well-informed citizenry is essential to a democratic society remains
not only a widely-held principle but (in theory at least) one of the most
progressive dominant ideas of our age.
The second and more straightforward assumption is that one of the
main sources of information available to people about politics and public
affairs is the news media, especially broadcast news. This is not to say that,
as Jonathan Gray (2005) points out, politics is not present throughout
popular culture, or that politics is equated with parliamentary democracy.
In discussing youth culture, David Buckingham (2000) argues that citizen-
ship cuts across public and domestic domains, and even in the public
domain, voting is just one form in which citizenship can be expressed. But
news, more than any other cultural form, carries the burden of defining
the world in which citizens operate.
For some time, surveys have established the importance of television as
an information source (Gunter, 1987). Despite the growth and potential of
new media – notably the internet – this remains true (Hargreaves and
Thomas, 2002). While news organizations are reluctant sometimes to
accept the responsibility that comes with this role, it is implicit in the core
principles of journalistic philosophy, whereby attempts to shackle or censor
the news media are seen as threats to democracy itself. It is also implicit
in arguments that it is the market, as well as governments, which can
circumscribe the content of news (Curran and Seaton, 1997; Herman and
Chomsky, 1988).
The third assumption is that, despite a plethora of news and infor-
mation outlets, the levels of knowledge about politics and public affairs in
most countries are often low and/or unevenly distributed, generally in
favour of more privileged social groups. Again, while some would argue
that sound democratic decisions can be made without knowing a great deal
(Sniderman et al., 1991), most studies suggest that generally, most people
are often sparsely informed – or else misinformed – about politics and
public affairs (Kull, 2004; Kull et al., 2003; Lemert, 1992; Lewis, 2001;
Lewis and Speers, 2003; Neuman et al., 1992; Scammell, 2004). It is also
clear that there is a relationship between knowledge, social inclusion and
power (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Nie et al., 1996; Norris, 2000).
Together, these assumptions indicate that democracy remains at best a
work-in-progress. For whatever reason, many people – especially those
furthest from positions of power – are not gathering enough information
from the news media to inform active forms of citizenship or democratic
decisions. Since this is the premise of this article, let it be added briefly that
it is not one reached hastily or without consideration of other possibilities.
Ciizenship, knowledge and power
There are various literatures that promote a more optimistic view of the
state of citizenship. Within political science, there is a body of work that 305
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argues that we do not need a great deal of knowledge about politics to
construct plausible political opinions, and that widely-shared, basic infor-
mation can provide the building blocks for meaningful and ‘rational’
citizenship (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991;
Zaller, 1992). These positions tend to have a limited notion of what consti-
tutes ‘rational citizenship’ and a benign view of the media as information
providers (for a more detailed discussion of this literature, see Lewis,
2001).
We find other strains of optimism within cultural studies, which has
stressed often that media audiences are active and engaged, and that the
political realm encompasses much of the cultural sphere (not just ‘news’).
Similarly, many within the sociology of science have applied much the
same arguments against a ‘deficit model’, in which public ignorance of
science is pitched against forms of scientific expertise and found wanting
(Dornan, 1999; Weingold, 2001). Both are reactions against positions that
tend to privilege certain kinds of knowledge and which, at the same time,
acknowledge only certain forms of citizen activity. So, for example, we can
see the ways in which television comedy contributes to people’s under-
standings of the public sphere (Gray, 2005). Or we can interpret the fact
that most people in the UK incorrectly assume that global warming is
caused by heat coming through the hole in the ozone layer (Hargreaves et
al., 2003) to be indicative of a more profound popular understanding that
links the hole in the ozone layer and global warming (since both are
environmental problems created by human activity).
Yet such optimism glosses over important inequities in information
distribution. It tends to romanticize popular or lay understandings or
assume that the building blocks for political opinions are well founded.
This is problematic on two counts. First, there are too many instances
where forms of power are linked to inequities in knowledge distribution,
whether it is the ability to vote for candidates whose policy positions a
person shares (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), or to construct meaning-
ful responses to opinion polls (Bourdieu, 1979).
Second, many of the basic assumptions that inform political opinions
are unreliable. For example, studies by the Program on International
Policy Attitudes in the United States have found that, at key political
periods, many people in the US hold assumptions about topical political
issues that are simply incorrect – such as the widespread belief that
Saddam Hussein was responsible for the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001 (Kull et al., 2003), or the assumption by many people who voted for
George Bush in 2004 that Bush backed (rather than opposed) the Kyoto
Treaty on climate change, along with many other international treaties
(Kull, 2004). Similarly, surveys by MORI (2000) demonstrate that the
hostility to refugees and asylum-seekers in Britain is informed by a series
of mistaken assumptions. Whatever else they do, these assumptions impov-
erish the state of public discourse and make it easier for political élites to306
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pursue initiatives which otherwise might meet with a measure of popular
resistance (Lewis, 2001).
Let it be stressed here that a fixed curriculum of political education is
not being advocated. As others have suggested, the kinds of information
favoured in school civics lessons often may be too abstract and arcane to be
very helpful to most people (Gifford, 2004; Neuman et al., 1992), especi-
ally if it is based on the idea that there is a set of political truths that tran-
scend public discourse which would set us free, were we to know them.
There is no flat plain of knowledge, no equality of facts, either in terms
of plausibility or usefulness. Yet this is where it becomes difficult, because
it forces us to address questions that élitist models of democracy or opti-
mistic accounts of citizenship can happily ignore. Specifically, what kinds
of knowledge or understanding can promote active and engaged citizen-
ship?
While this question is addressed often only obliquely, it is implicit in
any critique of the news media, since such critiques all presuppose that
some things are more useful for people to know than others. It is in this
context that this article shall attempt to develop the discussion. However,
before doing so, it will consider briefly the role that the news media play
in the state of citizenship.
News matters
As Laurie Ouellette (2002) has argued, dominant assumptions about
citizenship tend to blame popular taste for the failings of a media system
rather than the system itself. In other words, if a cultural industry becomes
stale, repetitive, formulaic and lacking in diversity, this is simply in
response to audience demands. Similarly, if news neglects issues of politi-
cal or public concern in favour of crime and celebrity culture, this is
because people are bored by the former and interested in the latter. In
short, the public gets what the public wants. Since the issue here is not so
much that information is unavailable (although it may be), merely that it
is not widely communicated and absorbed, the impetus is placed on indi-
viduals to find things out for themselves. As the argument runs, so long as
the information is out there somewhere, the news media can be scarcely
culpable if people choose to read about or watch something else.
The thrust of this argument is that the weak link in a democratic system
is the citizen. The problem with this position is not that it is pessimistic
(although it is), but that it is ahistorical. It assumes a fixed and limited
subjectivity, a society in which the ‘vulgar masses’ are always with us.
Indeed, the implication here is the knowledge required for people to
function as active citizens will be limited always to certain social groups.
And if we limit our vision in this way, then inevitably the notion of well
informed citizenry will be elusive.
It also assumes that the news media exist in a perfect market system in 307
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which all options are available, unsullied by the needs of advertisers and
profit maximization. In short, while the system is responsive to demand,
those demands come not just from audiences but advertisers (hence the
demise of newspapers with large audiences but insufficient advertising
revenue), and are subject to measures of profitability which may work
against the notion of public interest or investigative journalism. Indeed,
while consumers en masse can influence production, as an individual the
citizen is the least powerful voice in the complexity of practices that shape
a media system. Unlike the owner, editor, producer or journalist, they are
able to express themselves only through the monosyllabic language of
consumer purchases.
Of course, we cannot force people to be interested or active citizens. But
we can think about how to create the conditions in which active citizen-
ship may flourish. This touches many aspects of social life, of which the
news media are an important part by common practice. Or to put it more
positively, if citizens are to take a full part in democratic life, in practice
the news media will need to play a pivotal role in providing them with the
information with which to do so. In this sense, news is a vital part of any
democratic project (Glasser, 1999; Rosen, 1999).
News imperatives
There is a widely-understood awareness of the democratic importance of
news, yet journalism as a profession is strangely elusive about its purpose.
It is an endeavour with no agreed or standard set of objectives. It has no
clear theoretical tradition or philosophical principles (Franklin, 1997) – on
the contrary, it is suspicious of theory or philosophy (some of the most
withering attacks on media studies come from journalists). It is almost as
if serious analysis is antithetical to a profession which values constant
movement. Yet lurking beneath many debates about the news media are
a series of unspoken assumptions about the function of news. For example,
the debate about ‘dumbing down’ presupposes, in rather vague terms, that
the function of news is to inform and that ‘dumber’ news is less informa-
tive that ‘smart’ news. But inform people about what, exactly?
The sociology of news production has given us a fairly clear idea about
the various ideas that feed ‘news values’, as well as the various conventions
that inform the manufacture of news (Born, 2005; Gans, 1980; Schlesinger,
1978; Tuchman, 1978). This work demonstrates that there is nothing very
coherent about these values, and when we search for motivations or
procedures we often find contradictions. So, for example, the common idea
that the news is about matters of public importance has very little to do
with a value system that prizes conflict and violence (‘if it bleeds, it leads’).
Many of the contradictory impulses that shape modern journalism are
a product of its identity as a public information service channelled into a
commercial form. The history of journalism has been characterized in part308
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by this tension, and by the early 20th century it became clear that people
appeared to find some forms of public information – such as crime or sport
– more entertaining than others (Curran and Seaton, 1997; Harrison, 2006;
Williams, 1998). At the same time, the competitive ethos underpinning
this enterprise creates its own demands.
One of the most deeply embedded of these is what used to be called the
‘scoop’ – the journalist’s holy grail of being the first to uncover a story. In
one sense, the ‘scoop’ is a matching of notions of public interest with
commercialism: ‘we will tell you what you need to know before any of our
competitors do’. But while the spirit of the scoop remains an almost
unquestioned notion within journalism, it has evolved in ways that have
lost sight of audience need or desire. Indeed, some of its contemporary
manifestations have become faintly fetishistic and inward-looking.
The point here is that, unguided by any clear rationale, many of the
ideas informing journalism – what does or does not make a ‘good story’ –
have an almost arbitrary quality. Unlike other professions, journalism
requires comparatively little training and certainly no depth of under-
standing, often resorting to crude notions such as ‘instinct’ or having an
‘eye for a good story’. This does not mean that there is no set of common
understandings among journalists, simply that these understandings are
no more than the sum of their parts. Yet despite the pressures of commer-
cialism, the idea that news is there to inform citizenship, to tell people
what they need to know, remains a powerful part of this mix (McNair,
2005).
Reclaiming the notion of public service
Although I share the scepticism of many about the way in which the spirit
of public interest journalism is often invoked (see for example, Dahlgren,
1992; Franklin, 1997), it could be argued that as a principle it is something
to be embraced. Its instincts are democratic and it is philosophically allied
to notions of citizenship rather than consumerism. However, the forms
that public affairs journalism have adopted have not always been helpful
in promoting citizenship. It is not just that the notion of ‘public interest’
has been downgraded – from something being ‘in the public interest’ to
being something that ‘the public are interested in’ – but that it has become
socially divisive. In short, the public affairs tradition has tended to become
a class-specific discourse.
In her book on the failure of public television in the US, Laurie Ouel-
lette recounts a telling moment in the development of an approach that
doomed US public television to be watched by small groups of
professionals. As a public television executive commented about covering
a political convention: ‘If [President] Gerry Ford is giving a very dull
speech and a riot is going outside, we will stay with Gerry Ford’ (Ouellette,
2002: 121). In doing its democratic duty, US public television pursues a 309
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dull but worthy course, whose aesthetic values are bound up with class
distinctions about what it means to be a ‘good citizen’ (Bourdieu, 1984).
The assumption here is that, despite the longstanding links between
news and entertainment (Harrison, 2006), the pursuit of the popular is
somehow in contradiction with serious public affairs content. As John
Hartley (1996) argues, this is to conflate the popular with populism.
Indeed, this idea has become so deeply inscribed in recent journalistic
thinking that it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus on the one
hand, we have news as entertainment, in which public affairs issues are
replaced by crime, sport and celebrity, and on the other, ‘serious news’,
which focuses on politics and public affairs. While the two genres overlap
in various ways, the first is associated clearly with a popular, working-class
audience, the second with a more well-heeled, affluent and professional
audience. This explains in part why knowledge of politics and public
affairs is strongly related to social class and is implicit in many of the argu-
ments against ‘dumbing down’ (when any attempt to make news more
lively and engaging is regarded with suspicion).
If this distinction seems almost natural or inevitable, it has not always
been the case. When a popular, working-class press developed in Britain
in the first half of the 19th century, it was self-consciously and overtly
political, with democracy and citizenship central to its concerns (Curran
and Seaton, 1997; Williams, 1998). Even in the mid-20th century, Britain’s
most popular newspaper, the Daily Herald, had a strong public interest
remit delivered in a popular format. People are interested in things that
matter to them or to their beliefs about society; the failure of modern
public affairs journalism is that it has not been very good at stimulating,
engaging or developing this interest to those outside the ‘virtuous circle’
of news followers (Norris, 2000).
This does not mean abandoning the notion of public service – it is, in
many ways, all that stands in the way of a rampant consumerism – but of
redefining it in way that does not privilege the information-rich. This
involves asking what kinds of information, in practice, will enhance the
quality of citizenship in ways that are genuinely egalitarian? And while
there is no simple answer, it is a useful starting point for thinking about
the social or democratic value of news, rather than the fairly arbitrary set
of news values that inform current practice.
Informing citizenship as a news value
So far, it has been suggested that there is some scope for intervention in
the incoherent world of news values, since in the current climate it is not
at all clear – beyond high-minded declarations about the revelation of
truth – what the point of journalism is. A great deal of what passes for
news is stories whose only significance is that they may interest or amuse
us. The issue here is not that news is entertaining – far from it – but that310
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it often has no implications for citizenship (and any pretensions that it does
are generally spurious). As Peter Golding, writing about the British tabloid
press, comments wryly:
How much do we learn of the complex relationship between the intelligence
service and the state in a story about ‘MI5 Wife in Secret Love Split’ (Sun 18
December 1991) . . . Equally significant for our understanding of the changing
structure of family life in contemporary society would be such front page
features as ‘Sex Op Sister Stole My Man’ (Daily Star, 7 December 1992).
(Golding, 1994: 464)
In short, while there are many interesting possibilities here, a story such
as ‘Sex Op Sister Stole My Man’ is not written to address audiences as
anything other than spectators. These stories are self-referential – they do
not reveal or uncover a great deal beyond themselves.
If these stories are mandated by the economics of news production –
they provide a kind of light entertainment – nonetheless they are legiti-
mated by the mish-mash of ideas that constitute news values. After all, we
read them in newspapers. This legitimization is important, since it under-
scores the whole practice of news consumption. Part of the reason we
follow news is because we like to feel that we are being informed about
what is going on in the world. But once we begin to interrogate these
values, it becomes apparent that many of them serve neither a commercial
nor a public interest purpose. They have become (to use an old Althusser-
ian phrase) relatively autonomous from either function. Their operational
presence is justified by a tautology: it is news simply because it meets our
definition of what news is – what Peter Dahlgren (1992: 1) calls ‘the aura
of the self-evident’. Or, as David Altheide bluntly puts it: ‘news is whatever
news people say it is’ (1986: 17). Thus defined, it need serve no other
purpose.
As a consequence, sometimes news values can teeter on the edge of the
absurd, bound to enterprises so removed from any clear rationale that their
importance to journalists is matched only by their general pointlessness.
We now have the contemporary spectacle of news channels competing
with each other to be the ‘first with breaking news’, a struggle which is
generally of little interest to anyone outside journalism, since the differ-
ence between news channels is rarely more than a few minutes and most
‘breaking news’ stories are hardly matters of great urgency. Indeed, form
has superseded content, and the ability to brand something as ‘breaking
news’ often defines its presence, while most of what is called ‘breaking
news’ is either predictable or routine (Lewis et al., 2005a). If we were
being uncharitable, it is what we might call ‘the schlock of the new’.
Thus when Richard Lambert, in his review of the BBC News 24
channel, wrote that ‘an absolute determination to break news first must be
at the heart of everything the channel does’ (2002: 14), he was echoing 311
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journalistic wisdom. But his recommendation in practical terms is that
journalism is not about making sense of a story, assessing its significance
or presenting it in ways that engage viewers – all of which take at least a
little bit of time. Since the audience is not sitting there waiting for things
to happen (and is certainly not fretting in case they hear about a minis-
terial announcement or a development in a murder trial two minutes later
than if they had been watching the other channel), such urgency becomes
an imperative whose meaning scarcely carries beyond the news world.
What we might argue for, instead, is a set of news values in which
citizenship is foregrounded. In our study of the way that citizens are repre-
sented on television news in the US and UK (Lewis et al., 2005b), we
explored the various ways in which citizens are represented or invoked
routinely – whether as part of an opinion poll, ‘vox pop’ or simply by jour-
nalists referring to the public. The picture painted by our findings was that
television news tends to represent citizens as passive and apolitical. People
were shown reacting rather than proposing, offering descriptions rather
than opinions, recounting experiences rather than ideas. In sum, politics
was something done to people rather than something that people did.
In a sample of more than 4000 broadcast news items from the UK and
the US in which citizenship was invoked, we found that in only 4 percent
of instances did this involve citizens making even vague proposals about
what should be done in the world (Lewis et al., 2005b). For example, we
found many stories about public dissatisfaction with the British railway
system. And while we heard (or heard about) people grumbling about rail
services, at no point did we find any reference to the widespread public
support for returning the railways to public ownership – something that
a number of polls suggest is a popular view in the UK.
It is not that citizens are excluded from the news – far from it: we found
that, in one form or another, the news makes frequent reference to citizens
or publics – more that they are excluded from its action. But since they do
not propose, initiate, debate or engage, they are like ‘extras’ in the news
drama, providing background and mood, with little agency. Thus citizen-
ship is implicated in the discourse of news but in forms that are neither
enticing nor engaging, and never centre stage.
This is, in part, a consequence of the ‘top-down’ structure of news
reporting, which is so well established that it has become part of journal-
istic routine. News – especially news about politics – tends to be about what
important people say and do (e.g. Gans, 1980; Glasgow Media Group, 1980;
Hall et al., 1978; Paletz and Entman, 1981; Tuchman, 1978). It has become
a well-choreographed dance between media and politicians, a spectator
sport in which citizens play little part (Croteau and Hoynes, 1997). Or, as
David Buckingham puts it, politics is seen merely as a ‘kind of dishonest
game, which has little relevance to . . . everyday lives and concerns’ (2000:
202). The problem with this ‘top-down’ structure is not its dishonesty –
after all, we live in a fairly ‘top-down’ world – but that it systematically312
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positions citizens as audiences or observers of the news world rather than
as participants. Thus it is that the main ‘citizens’ slot’ on the news is the
vox pop (we found that around 40% of references to citizenship in our
news sample were vox pops; Lewis et al., 2005b), whereby someone is
plucked from the audience for a brief moment to respond to a news world
rather than actively participate in it.
This is not to say that the news should ignore those with power, abandon
notions of expertise or create news stories simply to provide citizens with
speaking parts. However, there is no doubt that more news about citizens
involved in community or social concerns certainly puts flesh on the idea
of citizenship. For example, on 19 January 2006, Sky News carried a five-
minute piece by Anthony Jay which was, in effect, a ‘how to’ guide to
citizen protest (albeit from the respectable and comfortable position of an
inhabitant of a bucolic English village). The story provided practical and
pithy advice on what to do when government or business trampled on
community concerns. Whatever its limits, from a citizenship perspective,
this new story was informative, relevant and engaging.
Implication of citizenship in the broader landscape
David Buckingham has written persuasively of the need for news to ‘find
ways of establishing the relevance of politics and of connecting the ‘micro-
politics’ of personal experience with the ‘macro-politics’ of the public
sphere’ (2000: 221; emphasis in original). But as he points out, this is about
more than simply sugaring the pill or jazzing up the news with what
Barbara Ehrenreich has called the ‘erotic promise’ (1990: 47) of
consumerism. It could be argued that for many news items, it is more a
question of implicating the citizen in the story, either conceptually or liter-
ally.
This involves asking not only ‘why and how does this matter to people?’
but also questioning a story’s raison d’être, asking why it is useful for people
to know something and what the information it contains adds to the
quality of citizenship. Of course, this is partly a matter of debate. There
is no prescribed syllabus of citizenship knowledge and, as has been
suggested here, this does not mean constructing a hierarchy of citizenship
practices or values. It is more a matter of approach, whereby citizenship
interests become integrated within a story’s mode of address. So, for
example, a story about a leadership contest within a political party is
assumed to have news value, and ‘public interest’ is understood generally
as no more than a question of which candidate we might find most likable.
Indeed, fearful of boring the audience and mindful of the appeal of
‘human interest’, reporters invariably feel some obligation to focus on
tangible personality differences rather than what are seen as more abstract
questions of policy. Thus it has become a well-established tradition of
political coverage to avoid too much discussion of concrete policy 313
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differences (Deacon et al., 2001; Jackson, 1996). But if we begin our
coverage by asking what difference it actually makes to people’s lives if
one candidate wins rather than another, it might become a very different
kind of contest: one where what is at stake is less about the fortunes of one
politician or another, and more about the way that we and others live.
This does not mean engaging in worthy, dispassionate policy debates, as
some of the high-minded advocates of serious journalism would have it,
but turning policy into a kind of human interest story. For it is not just a
question of implicating citizenship, but of doing so in a way that is less
likely to compound disparities in knowledge. All too often, the ‘ideal
viewer’ of serious news is what we might call the already-informed citizen:
someone who knows the background, history and significance of a story,
who will appreciate the detail and specificity of the latest instalment. For
those outside this virtuous circle, this mode of address is at best dull and
difficult, and at worst, profoundly alienating (Lewis, 2001; Neuman et al.,
1992).
I have argued elsewhere (Lewis, 1991, 2003) that the narrative struc-
ture of news – or lack thereof – compounds this problem. Unlike most
forms of popular culture, most news stories are not structured in ways that
engage or involve audiences in a story’s development. But the point here
has more to do with perspective than with form. In a recent study of news
channels (Lewis et al., 2005a), we attempted to distinguish between two
very different ways of providing context and analysis in broadcast news:
one which spoke only to the already-informed citizen, and one which
addressed a broader notion of citizenship.
The first, which we called ‘narrow issue analysis’, assumed rather than
explored a story’s significance, providing detail and discussion within a
narrow frame. This might be a story that focused on the latest parlia-
mentary controversy or explored the circumstances of a recent crime. We
found that this kind of analysis was by far the most common on UK news
(examples were found on 40% of the news items on the BBC Ten O’Clock
News and on around 10% to 15% of news items on the British news
channels; Lewis et al., 2005a).
The second, which we called ‘big picture analysis’, made some attempt
to explain a story’s context, meaning or significance. This might involve
the use of historical context, regional or international comparisons or
simply some discussion of why the news story mattered. This might mean
allowing citizens more space to develop the political agenda or looking at
a crime in its wider context, considering who was at risk and how this
compared with other risks that they might face (Lewis et al., 2005a). This
kind of context may be much more useful to most viewers, but is rarely
provided. We found examples of these forms of context on fewer than 10
percent of items on the BBC Ten O’Clock News, and hardly at all on the
British news channels (Lewis et al., 2005a).
However, we also know that while many people find the first mode of314
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address difficult and confusing, providing information about the ‘big
picture’ is likely to inspire interest and engagement (Neuman et al., 1992;
Philo, 2002). This is in part because the first addresses the audience as a
dispassionate spectator, while the second has a notion of citizenship
inscribed within its structure.
The proposal here is not to create two kinds of news – one for the well-
informed, one for the rest – but to reconceive news by focusing on what it
is useful for people to know. The problem with narrow issue analysis is not
only that it assumes interest and understanding, but that it does not place
citizenship at its centre. For example, when we looked at news coverage of
cuts in British military spending in July 2004, we found a number of
stories that provided a narrow focus on the issue, with commentary and,
at times, detail from military figures and analysts (Lewis et al., 2005a). For
those with vested interests, these stories may have connected to larger
issues but they failed to ask what was at stake for most citizens. Indeed, for
most viewers, it would be hard to make much sense of this story. At no
point in the coverage did we get a sense of how the British military budget
compares with European countries (it remains the largest), or more
profoundly, its purpose in the post-Cold War world. And yet, remarkably,
the rationale behind current military spending or policy is rarely discussed.
This lack of public discussion could have provided an opportunity for jour-
nalists to address the bigger picture, asking what kinds of military risks
the UK faces in a post-Soviet world and what kind of spending is needed
to meet them. This would be to address the citizen directly, either as a
taxpayer or as a citizen of a nation-state.
In some ways, for a journalist to begin by questioning the significance
of a story from a citizen’s perspective is a radical departure from existing
practice. The focus on the spectacular rather than the typical – endemic
in news coverage of crime, for example – rarely implicates citizenship in
useful or informative ways. Similarly, our analysis of the ‘news interview’
on British news channels suggested that the aim of many interviews is less
to illuminate a subject than to create or develop a story (by extracting a
newsworthy quote from the interviewee). Put another way, their function
is to generate heat rather than light (Lewis et al., 2005a).
This is reflected further in the sources favoured by news, which prefers
those with power rather than information. We found that, between them,
people from science and medicine, universities, think tanks and research
bodies, non-governmental organizations, government and other public
agencies, accounted for only 7 to 12 percent of sources on British news
channels, while politicians alone accounted for between 20 and 30 percent
(Lewis et al., 2005a). And yet it is the first group who are more likely to
provide a wider political context. The challenge is to find ways of turning
this perspective – rather than the assertions of those in power – into
headlines.
And yet the notion that the news is there to inform citizenship – what 315
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is referred to in the US as ‘public journalism’ (Glasser, 1999; Rosen, 1999)
– remains remarkably robust, in theory if not in practice. It is for this
reason that many of the shibboleths of journalistic theory, notions of
objectivity which implicitly invoke democracy and citizenship, should be
seen less as problematic (the traditional scholarly view) than as an oppor-
tunity. Thus when ‘journalists . . . cling tenaciously to the view that news
at its best renders the world transparent’ (Glasser and Marken, 2005: 265),
we can dismiss such a view easily as philosophically naive, pointing out
the many ways in which journalistic practice is an ideological practice
embedded within power structures. However, without this idealism, jour-
nalism is diminished and there is little to prevent notions of citizenship
becoming suffused by consumerist imperatives.
Instead, there is an opening to work with and develop those democratic
instincts that inform journalistic values. While the many difficulties in
such a project cannot be underestimated, the alternative is to ignore the
democratic promise of news, abandoning it to market forces or an idea of
public journalism as a discourse for the already-informed.
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